BHP journal: Leviticus 18:22; 20:13: Laws
Oh this will be fun.
First of all, I want to clarify my own position, which is that the apparent prohibitions of sex between males does not apply to Christians today. I don't think I really go into it beyond that, because I was trying to keep my post as short as possible. And if something is proven not to apply, why dig into it? (Of course there are lots of good reasons to dig into it, but not in a 2000 word post.)
So my position is that the text of the prohibitions in the Old Testament do in fact seem to widely prohibit anal sex between men. If these commands could be proven to still apply to Christians today, one would have to argue that male cult prostitution and extreme violent depravity (such as in Sodom) are in view, which of course they are (and Gagnon admits to both of these). And there are a lot of other interesting things that weaken the argument of direct applicability of these commands to modern Christians, but I'm not making these arguments here.
There is so much here with this section in Gagnon I don't know where to start. I'm not saying it's bad - generally I think it's fair, very well done, and a helpful, balanced discussion. (Surprised?)
I guess while we're on the topic, I can mention that Gagnon suggests that the prohibition "is carried over into the New Testament" by Paul. He does say this "case is not completely airtight." And just off the bat, there is no mention of same-sex sex acts in the New Testament that is prescriptive so I'm not sure what he's referring to. Further, in my own argument, I've shown that Gordon and Fee explicitly make the case that no Old Testament laws can be shown to be carried over into the New Testament except for the Ten Commandments, and the two great commandments. Yes, Gordon and Fee also explicitly disagree with my affirming conclusion of modern consensual same-sex relationships, but the path they use (which they don't say much about at all) does not include saying that the Old Testament prohibitions are affirmed in the New Testament.
Deal with it.
I've observed myself that the Old Testament laws apply only to men, and not women. But bestiality is forbidden explicitly for both men and women in the immediate context. To me this implies that there is something aside from the intimacy between the same gender that is in view here. And with things as diverse as child sacrifice and sex with a woman during menstruation also in the direct context of both passages, it seems reasonable that cleanliness and cult practice may be in view. Again, I don't know. But there must be a reason.
Gagnon agrees that homosexual cult prostitution is at least partly in view, and he makes some really interesting arguments that procreation is also partly in view. He just doesn't think these things are primary. Fine.
It seems his main argument once again is the "mixing of non-complementary genders." But first, there is a lot of mixing of things of different types that is forbidden in the law, and we would all agree that these things no longer apply. So why would homosexuality? I think Gagnon would argue that the fact it is referred to as an abomination and is associated with the death penalty are two reasons. I don't really buy the "abomination" thing because that seems too easily proven to be inconsistently applied. (He argues otherwise.) The death penalty is a good one, and I'll address that below. But in the case of the mixing of non-complementary genders being the primary trespass, why would only men be mentioned? He does give some decent reasons as to why women may not be mentioned, but none of them address this point directly.
If your main argument is the mixing of non-complementary genders, it weakens the moral argument, because there is not another case of the mixing non-complementary essences that we still abide by. It seems to me that if you admit that homosexual cult prostitution, and unbridled immorality related with homosexuality (e.g. Sodom) are in view, the moral case remains strong, as does the penalty of death, and the mixing of non-complementary genders becomes a secondary reason. It just makes more sense.
He does not offer a reason why the mixing of non-complementary genders would still be prohibited while with fabrics it is not, except for the idea that Paul reasserts the prohibition in the New Testament, but he himself admits that's not a closed case.
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